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The Variable Impact  
of the Global Economic Crisis  
in South East Europe 
Will Bartlett and Ivana Prica 
 
1. Introduction  
This paper studies the variable impact of the global economic crisis on 
the countries of South East Europe1. This group of transition economies, 
as elsewhere throughout Eastern Europe, has been severely affected by 
the recession (Prica and Uvalić 2009). However, while some countries 
within the region have been deeply affected, others appear to have 
been relatively lightly touched by the crisis so far. What factors could 
account for this variation in outcomes? In so far as the countries of the 
region experienced a common external shock, it would seem that the 
differential responses must have been conditioned by between-country 
differences in initial conditions at the start of the crisis. In this paper we 
investigate the role of the two key sets of initial conditions (i) the role of 
differences in institutional frameworks which were developed during 
the earlier period of transition and (ii) the role of differences among the 
countries of the region in their degree of integration into the world 
economy. 
                                                 
1
 The following countries are included in South East Europe: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Greece, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia, and Turkey. The main focus is on the transition economies, and Greece 
and Turkey are included as comparators. 
 [2] 
Considering the role of the institutional framework developed during 
the transition, Mitra et al. (2010) ask whether the transition itself 
planted seeds of vulnerability that made the transition countries more 
prone to crisis and limited the ability of transition economies to recover 
from it. A more optimistic view of institutional reform suggests that 
countries that have made more progress with transition and have built 
better institutions supportive of a flexible market economy would be 
better able to adjust to the impact of an external shock; this could 
account for the variability in the impact of the crisis on economic 
performance. This view which stresses the link between progress with 
reforms and economic performance has become the conventional 
wisdom (see for example EBRD 2008). There is also a possibility of a 
reverse feedback from the crisis to institutions through its effect on 
progress with economic reforms. In some cases the crisis may block 
progress, while in others it may even speed it up (EBRD, 2009). Several 
types of institutions determine the degree of flexibility of an economy 
including the extent of EU integration, progress with transition, the 
business environment and the quality of governance, as will be 
discussed further below. 
In contrast, it could be argued that the institutional framework is 
irrelevant and that variability in the impact of the crisis is simply due to 
the fact that countries that are less integrated into the global economy 
have been less affected by it and vice versa. This argument emphasises 
that the effects of crisis were transmitted through a decrease in 
demand from the EU core countries to the European peripheral 
countries. It suggests that variability in exposure to demand for exports 
and migrant labour, in access to credit, and in inflows of foreign 
investment and remittances have been the main cause of the 
differential impact of the economic crisis in the region.  
 [3] 
There are consequently several possible explanations for the variable 
impact of the economic crisis on the countries of the region.  Firstly, 
differences in the initial structural conditions provide different exposure 
to different transmission mechanisms from the external environment. 
For example, countries that have a larger export industry and a larger 
share of exports in gross value added may be more exposed to falling 
demand for exports than others. Secondly, differences in the initial 
institutional conditions due to transition reforms may have provided 
different exposure to the transmission mechanisms. Those countries 
that have made more progress in institutional reform and have 
developed better market mechanisms may have been better able to 
adjust to the impact of the external shock than others, and vice versa. 
Thirdly, the economic policies of domestic governments and 
international institutions may mitigate or worsen the impact of the 
adverse external environment.  In this paper these various influences 
are examined in turn.  
Section 2 provides an overview of the effects of the crisis in the SEE 
region, section 3 identifies the variable extent of the transmission 
mechanisms across countries, taking into account credit contraction, 
foreign direct investment, remittances and exports and their interaction 
with domestic structural conditions. Section 4 considers the role of 
institutions in moderating the effects of the crisis taking into account 
progress with EU accession, progress with transition, and the quality of 
governance. Section 5 considers the impact of domestic and 
international anti-crisis policies in mitigating the effects of the crisis. 
Section 6 concludes. 
  
 [4] 
 
2. The Global Economic Crisis: Impact on South East Europe 
The sharpness of the contraction in SEE is underlined by data for real 
GDP growth for 2009 – 2010, along with data on the change in an index 
of industrial production for 2008-09 and the increase in the 
unemployment rate, in percentage points, for the period 2008-2010. In 
the analysis that follows we use the change in GDP as the main 
indicator. 
TABLE 1: Change in real GDP and industrial production (% p.a.) 
 Real GDP growth (% p.a.) Change in 
industrial 
production  
(% p.a.)  
2008-2009 
(a) 
Increase in 
unemployment 
rate in 
percentage points 
(LFS data)  
2008-10 (b) 
2008 2009 2010 
Average 
2009 - 
2010 
Albania 7.7 3.3 3.0 3.2 .. .. 
Turkey 0.7 -4.7 8.0 1.7 -9.7 0.9 
Macedonia 4.8 -0.8 0.8 0.0 .. .. 
Serbia 5.5 -3.1 1.6 -0.8 -12.1 5.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.0 -2.8 0.8 -1.0 1.5 3.8 
Bulgaria 6.2 -4.9 0.4 -2.3 -17.4 4.6 
Moldova 7.8 -6.5 1.5 -2.5 .. .. 
Montenegro 7.5 -5.7 -0.6 -3.2 -31.9 .. 
Greece (a) 1.0 -2.0 -4.5 -3.3 -9.0 4.9 
Slovenia 3.7 -8.1 1.1 -3.5 -17.3 4.6 
Croatia 2.4 -5.8 -1.5 -3.7 -9.2 3.4 
Romania 7.3 -7.1 -2.0 -4.6 -5.5 .. 
Source: EBRD online data; (a) Eurostat online data; (b) CPESSEE (2011)  
 
As can be seem from Table 1, Albania and Turkey have weathered the 
crisis rather well, with the latter pulling out of recession with a rapid 8% 
GDP growth in 2010. A second group of countries in the Southern 
 [5] 
Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia) had relatively 
high pre-crisis growth. They experienced only a moderate decline in 
2009 followed by a modest growth in 2010 giving an average growth for 
2009-2010 of between 0.0% and -1.0% of GDP. A third group of two 
countries including one EU member state (Bulgaria and Moldova) had 
relatively sharp declines of between -5.4% and -6.0% in 2009 followed 
by modest recoveries in 2010 putting the overall growth for the two 
years between -2% and -3%. The final group comprises Croatia, Greece, 
Montenegro, Romania and Slovenia all of which with the exception of 
Slovenia had two years of negative growth with declines of between -
2.0 to -8.1% of GDP in 2009 giving an average decline for 2009 and 2010 
in excess of -3% of GDP. Slovenia ends up in this group because of its 
very sharp contraction in 2009 followed by a feeble recovery. 
In most countries, industrial production and exports fell even more 
precipitously than GDP. In Montenegro, industrial production fell by a 
staggering 32% between 2008 and 20092. Double digit falls in industrial 
production were registered in Bulgaria, Serbia and Slovenia. Export 
values fell by more than 20% in all the countries in 2009. Labour Force 
Survey data show that between 2008 and 2010 the unemployment rate 
increased from 23.4% to 27.2% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 14% to 
19.2% in Serbia, from 8.4% to 11.8% in Croatia and from 4.4% to 7.3% in 
Slovenia.3 The crisis has also had wider social impact increasing poverty 
and lowering the quality of life for people throughout the region 
(Bartlett 2010). 
  
                                                 
2
 According to Eurostat industrial production statistics online data March 2011 
3
 See CPESSEE (2011) 
 [6] 
BUILD-UP TO THE CRISIS 
In the period between 2000 and 2008 the economies of the SEE region 
had enjoyed a mini-boom, mainly been fuelled by large inflows of 
international finance in the form of bank credits enabling increased 
domestic borrowing by both firms and households. While government 
expenditure had also grown, in many countries it had been kept in 
check due to the success of the IMF and the EU in persuading 
governments to keep a lid on spending. Rapid growth spurred an 
increase in imports which, in the context of relatively uncompetitive 
economies, led to increased current account deficits despite significant 
remittance flows in some countries. Current account deficits became 
extremely high in Montenegro (50.7% of GDP in 2008) and Bulgaria 
(23.9%).  
Thus, most countries in SEE had based their growth since 2000 on a 
credit boom enabled by large scale foreign borrowing. Current account 
deficits widened to more than 10% of GDP in 2008 everywhere except 
in Croatia, Slovenia and Turkey. In 2008, extremely high current account 
deficits were experienced in Serbia (17.9%), Bulgaria (23.9%) and 
Montenegro (50.7%). While this would be an acceptable way to finance 
economic growth if the resources were shrewdly used for investment, 
the reality was that in many cases there was a large element of 
consumer boom involved, while in the case of Bulgaria and Montenegro 
property bubbles also underlay the rapid growth in financial inflows. 
The current account deficits were covered by large capital inflows 
including foreign borrowings that led to an increase in the ratio of 
external debt to GDP in most countries (see Figure 1). Five countries, 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Serbia and Turkey 
experienced moderate or even negative growth in their external debt to 
 [7] 
GDP ratio over the six years from 2003-08.4 In 2009 these countries 
managed to keep their external debt down to below 60% of GDP. 
However in four countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia, 
the ratio of external debt to GDP exceeded 90% of GDP in 2008 and 
2009, exposing them to difficulty in refinancing their debts. The most 
rapid growth in external debt occurred in Montenegro whose debt 
increased from 27% of GDP in 2003 to 97% in 2008. 
 
FIGURE 1: External Debt to GDP Ratio (2003, 2008, 2009) (%) 
 
Source: EBRD online data 2011 
  
                                                 
4
 Bosnia and Herzegovina’s external debt had even fallen from 54% of GDP in 2003 to 
38% in 2008. 
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3. Transmission Mechanisms and Domestic Structure 
Four external transmission mechanisms relayed the economic crisis 
from the centre to the SEE region. Firstly the mainly foreign owned 
banking sector transmitted the collapse in global credit flows to SEE. 
Secondly, there has been a sharp reduction in inflows of foreign direct 
investment which has hit some countries harder than others. Thirdly, 
reduced demand for labour in the core market economies has had a 
dramatic effect on remittance flows on which some SEE countries are 
heavily dependent. Fourthly, reduced global demand for imports 
significantly impacted on the exports from the SEE countries. 
 
THE BANKING SECTOR AND CREDIT GROWTH 
An important transmission mechanism has been the global restriction of 
credit which has especially affected transition economies with a high 
penetration of foreign banks (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011). Over the 
last decade, foreign banks have been eager to establish subsidiaries and 
daughter companies in the region due to the relatively high returns 
available in emerging markets with underdeveloped financial systems. 
In several SEE countries foreign banks had acquired substantial holdings 
in the domestic banking sectors and were easily able to expand their 
operations due to the growing demand for credit. The high penetration 
of foreign banks in the region is noteworthy, with the exception of 
Moldova, Slovenia and Turkey. Elsewhere the asset share of foreign 
banks had, by 2008, reached over 75%, and in Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia it had reached over 90%. 
The share of domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of 
GDP also increased over the five years from 2003-2008. The highest 
share of domestic credit to the private sector, often taken as an 
 [9] 
indicator of financial liberalisation, was reached in Croatia (68.1%), 
Bulgaria (71.1%) and Slovenia (85.1%) in 2008. In addition, domestic 
lending was often denominated in foreign currency, a factor which has 
led to increased instability especially in 2011 when the rise in value of 
the Swiss franc led to serious distress among mortgage borrowers in 
Croatia and elsewhere5.  
FIGURE 2: Domestic Credit Growth 2008 and 2009 (% p.a.) 
 
Source: EBRD online data 2011 
 
From 2003-2008, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia experienced 
annual rates of credit growth in excess of 30%. In Bosnia and 
                                                 
5
 In August 2011, the Croatian government and banks agreed to fix the exchange rate 
for housing loans denominated in Swiss francs at 5.80 kuna per franc for a period of five 
years in order to ease pressure on borrowers (Reuters 17 August 2011). The difference 
between the actual payments under the fixed rate, and the contracted payments under 
the actual exchange rate, will be repayable at the end of the period, plus an interest 
payment on the outstanding amount charged at a rate of 3.95 per cent per annum. The 
problem was widespread. In June 2011, some 300,000 households in Hungary defaulted 
on their mortgage loans. 
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 [10] 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia and Turkey, average annual rates of 
credit growth were between 20% and 30% over this period. Croatia, 
which had the highest share of domestic credit to GDP in 2003 managed 
to keep credit growth within reasonable bounds, averaging 15% over 
the period, due to restrictions by the central bank. By 2008, annual 
rates of credit growth exceeded 30% in six countries (see Figure 2). 
One of the hallmark features of the economic crisis was a sudden 
collapse of credit on a global level as banks stopped lending to each 
other in fear of unknown and uncertain exposure to toxic debts 
(Roubini 2010). This effect was also experienced in South East Europe 
where a sudden stop in credit growth struck almost all the countries at 
the same time. Turkey was relatively little affected, as most of its banks 
were domestically owned, although credit growth even fell sharply in 
Slovenia which also had a low penetration by foreign banks. Credit 
growth came to sudden stop in 2009 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, and Macedonia, and fell sharply in Albania, Bulgaria, Slovenia 
and Romania. In Serbia, credit growth remained above 10%, but being 
far lower than what had gone before had a dramatic negative effect on 
the economy (Petrović, 2011). The sudden stop in credit growth meant 
that banks were no longer lending to the business sector and businesses 
were unable to roll over their loans. This, together with the generally 
deteriorating economic conditions led to a dramatic increase in non-
performing loans in the region. Between 2008 and 2009 the proportion 
of non-performing loans increased everywhere in the region. It 
exceeded 10% in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro, countries which 
had experienced the most rapid rates of credit growth in the pre-crisis 
 [11] 
period6. Defaults have continued to increase, reaching almost 18% in 
Serbia by the end of 2010 (Cetković, 2011).  
In 2009, after the credit crunch struck, the fall in the rate of domestic 
credit growth7 seems to have been greater in those countries which had 
a higher presence of foreign banks (see Figure 3). While there may be 
other reasons for the variation in the relationship between these two 
variables, the observed correlation between them is indicative that in 
SEE the transmission of the crisis through the credit channel may have 
been affected by the initial structural conditions of the banking sector 
(the share of foreign ownership). 
FIGURE 3: Change in Domestic Credit Growth (2008-09)  
and Foreign Bank Ownership (2008) 
 
 
                                                 
6
 EBRD online data 2011 
7
 The change in the rate of domestic credit growth is computed as the proportional 
difference in the rate of domestic credit growth in 2008 and 2009 respectively. 
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 [12] 
The significance of this relationship may become even more profound 
as the next stage of the crisis unfolds related to the increasing risk 
attached to eurozone sovereign debt. This latest manifestation of the 
crisis may pose further dangers to the SEE countries in the near future. 
Greece has been particularly affected by the fall in credit rating of its 
sovereign debt, which is having spillover effects on the solvency of 
Greek banks. Reportedly, Greek banks stopped making transfers to SEE 
subsidiaries in 2009, leaving them to fund their lending entirely out of 
local deposits8. Given the depth of the crisis in Greece there is a chance 
that Greek banks may significantly reduce their exposure in the SEE 
region as a result of funding and liquidity pressures on the Greek parent 
banks (Kekic, 2010). Also, sovereign debt risks may spread to some SEE 
countries should  external debt to GDP ratios rise to unsustainable 
levels, and should refinancing this debt become problematic. 
 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
A major impact of the economic crises has come through sharp 
reductions in the inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Large FDI 
inflows came to Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, although other 
countries of the Western Balkans were less successful in attracting large 
scale FDI. Slovenia was the only country exporting FDI. In per capita 
terms, the largest pre-crisis net FDI inflows were achieved by Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Montenegro in 2006-2007 (see Figure 4). In all countries, 
except Albania and Montenegro, the inflow of FDI fell sharply as a 
consequence of the economic crisis. Comparing per capita inflows for 
2009-2010 with those which had been achieved in 2006-2007, it is 
noticeable that the sharpest falls took place in Bulgaria and Croatia, the 
                                                 
8
 Patrick Jenkins and Kerin Hope (2009) “Greece sees few glimmers of hope”, Financial 
Times, 15/12/09. 
 [13] 
countries with the highest pre-crisis per capita inflows9. This suggests 
that the extent of openness to flows of foreign direct investment has 
been a major cause of the transmission of the crisis to the region in this 
group of countries. 
FIGURE 4: Net FDI Inflow Per Capita 2006-2007 & 2009-2010 (US$) 
 
Source: EBRD online data 
 
In SEE, FDI has been concentrated in a narrow range of sectors and 
distributed unevenly through time. In the Western Balkans the largest 
FDI inflows have been strongly linked to privatisation in sectors such as 
telecommunications, banking and oil refining. The widespread foreign 
investment in the banking sector has integrated the region into global 
finance and capital markets, reducing interest rates, increasing the 
availability of loans, and providing a strong stimulus to economic 
                                                 
9
 In Montenegro per capita inflows did not begin to decrease until 2010. 
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growth.  The EBRD has argued, on the basis of cross-country growth 
regressions, that financial integration contributed to economic growth 
in the region over the last decade but that on the downside it also 
encouraged credit booms and over-borrowing, especially in foreign 
currency, which has increased vulnerability of the region (EBRD 2009: 
chapter 3). A significant recent factor in the development of FDI in the 
region has been the increasing activity of intra-regional investment. As 
mentioned above Slovenian companies have begun to make large 
investments in the Western Balkans, and in recent years there have 
been some major investments by Croatian companies too. 
 
REMITTANCES 
Remittance flows are a key transmission mechanism for the impact of 
the economic crisis on the SEE countries. Moldova, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Albania, and Serbia10 stand out with very high shares of 
remittance income in GDP.  Remittances have so far held up in Albania 
and Serbia, while they have fallen sharply in Moldova and Romania (see 
Table 2). This may have been an important contributing factor in the 
sharp fall in GDP in these two countries in 2009. There is however no 
clear reason why these countries have been especially affected in this 
way. 
Data on remittances are by their nature difficult to obtain and their 
reliability is questionable. For example, the data on remittances to 
Macedonia are highly disputed. Bucevska and Bucevska (2009) estimate 
remittance flows to Macedonia at an average annual level of 14% of 
GDP over the period from 2000-2008.  
                                                 
10
 Kosovo also relies highly on remittances to finance its economy, but the data is sparse 
and unreliable. 
 [15] 
TABLE 2: Remittances 
 Remittances as a share of GDP, 
2008 (%) 
% decline in remittance flow 
2008-09 
Moldova 31.4% 21.4% 
Romania 4.7% 14.7% 
Bulgaria 5.3% 5.0% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 14.8% 3.9% 
Slovenia 0.6% 2.5% 
Greece 0.8% 2.5% 
Croatia 2.3% 1.9% 
Turkey 0.2% 1.8% 
Serbia 11.1% 1.8% 
Macedonia 4.3% 1.3% 
Albania 12.2% 0.0% 
Source: World Bank remittances data base 
 
EXPORTS 
One of the main transmission mechanisms of the crisis has been 
external demand for exports from the EU, the main trading partner for 
the region. Jovičić (2009) studied the relationship between the degree 
of trade integration to the EU market and the timing and intensity of 
the onset of the crisis effects among the Western Balkan countries. She 
found that while those with a high degree of trade integration 
experienced the crisis sooner, those with a lower degree of integration 
experienced a larger decrease in production.  
Table 3 shows the extent of the collapse in merchandise exports in the 
region between 2008 and 2009. Exports in all countries fell by more 
than 20% over the year, with the largest drop in Montenegro and 
Macedonia where merchandise exports fell by one third or more  
 [16] 
TABLE 3: Merchandise Exports (US$ millions)  
 2008 2009 % Change 
Montenegro 684 411 -39.9% 
Macedonia 3,971 2,685 -32.4% 
Bulgaria 22,484 16,503 -26.6% 
Croatia 14,460 10,718 -25.9% 
Serbia 10,957 8,366 -24.0% 
Slovenia 29,607 22,502 -24.0% 
Romania 33,725 29,117 -22.7% 
Albania 1,356 1,048 -22.7% 
Turkey 140,801 109,672 -22.1% 
Bosnia 5,194 4,080 -21.4% 
Source: EBRD Online data 2011 
  
 [17] 
 
4. Institutions  
The role of institutions in explaining economic growth differences 
among transition countries has recently attracted much attention. A 
general link between institutional quality and economic growth in 
transition countries has been demonstrated by Beck and Laeven (2006). 
Theories of the political economy of transition have stressed the 
negative impact of uncompleted transition on economic growth 
(Hellman, 1998). Ruling elites may engage in rent seeking behaviour so 
as to benefit from dominant positions connected to large state or 
private companies with a significant market share, blocking the entry of 
new entrepreneurial firms.  
Overall, the institutional features which may determine the impact of 
the economic crisis relate to progress with transition to a market 
economy, the quality of institutions which have been developed, and 
the quality of government policy making. In addition, countries which 
have made most progress in integrating with the EU and in adopting EU-
compatible institutions may be more vulnerable to the crisis, as they 
may be more open to the transmission effects through financial flows 
and falling export demand. At the same time they may also be better 
placed to benefit from the recovery, since businesses in those countries 
operate within a more supportive institutional environment. 
A different approach, which identifies different ‘varieties of capitalism’, 
places more emphasis on ‘institutional complementarities’ than to the 
identification of interest groups which block reform. These institutional 
complementarities define a limited cluster of forms of capitalism. 
Amable (2003) distinguishes between the Liberal Market economy, the 
Continental European model, and the Mediterranean model of 
capitalism. Key institutions which distinguish capitalist systems include 
the configurations of product markets, labour markets, systems of 
 [18] 
finance and corporate governance, the welfare system and the 
education system. Different combinations of these give rise to different 
models of capitalism within which institutional complementarity 
enables distinct models to evolve over time. These different forms of 
the capitalism might be expected to display different responses to the 
impact of global economic crisis.  
A related approach to the analysis of the  varieties of capitalism 
suggests that economies differ in the degree of coordination among the 
social partners, with some having more coordination (Continental 
European corporatism) while others have more atomised market 
structures (Liberal Market model) (Lane and Myint, 2006). The latter 
should be more susceptible to market fluctuations. Within South East 
Europe, the Western Balkan countries have relied heavily on 
international assistance and the institutional mix which has emerged 
has typically been based on policy transfer from a variety of different 
sources and on uncoordinated policy advice. This has resulted in a 
rather exotic mixture of economic and social reforms, and the 
institutional configurations that have emerged have often been neither 
complementary nor compatible (Bartlett 2006). The emergent forms of 
capitalism therefore may not fall neatly into the boxes identified in the 
varieties of capitalism literature.  
 
EU INTEGRATION 
The accession process has required countries to gradually adopt EU-
compatible reforms in order to harmonise their laws to the acquis 
communautaire, create new institutions such as Competition Agencies, 
and reform existing institutions to conform to EU standards. In deciding 
whether to proceed through any stage of the accession process, ruling 
elites must weigh up the costs of implementing reforms against the 
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benefits of accession. If the costs of accession are greater than the 
benefits for the decision making elite, then a country may turn away 
from the EU integration process. However, since the benefit of EU 
accession is rather high for most of the Western Balkan countries, a 
strategy of non-accession would most likely only be chosen by ruling 
elites which have much to lose from adopting EU rules.  
Table 4: Progress with EU Integration  
and Average GDP Growth 2009-2010 
 
EU membership and 
accession status 
Country 
Average growth 
GDP 
2009-10 
EU Members Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Slovenia -3.4 
Candidate states Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey -1.3 
Potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia 0.5 
Source: Table 1 
 
Belke et al. (2009) have shown that progress with EU integration has a 
positive effect on institutional quality as measured by the World Bank 
Governance Indicators. During periods of instability however, these 
elements of market integration and institutional formation may 
facilitate the transmission of market disturbances to the more 
integrated countries. While some have engaged with this process more 
enthusiastically than others, it seems that there is a clear relationship 
between the degree of EU integration in the SEE region and the extent 
to which countries were adversely affected by the economic crisis 
(Table 4). 
 
TRANSITION PROGRESS 
Studies of the relationship between transition progress and economic 
growth have focused on the distinction between initial conditions and 
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subsequent policies. De Melo et al. (2001) found that, following a 
negative initial impact, liberalizing reforms have a positive long-run 
effect on growth and that the effect of reforms is stronger, the more 
adverse are the initial conditions. Over time, the impact of initial 
conditions inevitably diminishes and the positive impact of reforms 
comes to the fore (Falcetti et al. 2005). Thus, in Serbia and Montenegro, 
the anti-reform coalition which initially resisted reforms eventually lost 
influence as the extent of the losses which the majority had suffered 
from blocked reforms became apparent. Subsequently, the pro-reform 
coalition which came to power after 2000 was able to make rapid 
progress with reform from that time on. Applying the calculus of 
winners and losers to the Western Balkans, the early reformers who 
braved the cost of reform enjoyed a growth premium (Bartlett 2008). In 
contrast, the late reform countries, where anti-reform coalitions were 
able to mobilize blocking majorities from among the potential losers 
suffered, and are still suffering, a growth penalty.  
The extent to which countries have made progress with transition and 
have become functioning market economies has been identified by an 
index computed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) which presents expert evidence on the extent of 
transition along various dimensions. Panel data regression studies have 
shown that real GDP per capita growth rates in transition economies 
are positively associated with the extent of progress with transition as 
measured by the EBRD index, other indices of transition reforms, as well 
as macroeconomic stabilisation policies and changes in the terms of 
trade (Falcetti et al. 2005; Iradian 2009)11. In SEE, in the early stages of 
transition between 1991 and 2004, the correlation between reform 
progress and economic growth was positive in Albania, Croatia and 
                                                 
11
 Some earlier studies failed to identify this effect. See e.g. Fidrmuc (2003). 
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Macedonia, while it was all but zero in Serbia where reforms made least 
headway in the 1990s (Bartlett 2008). 
Figure 5: GDP Growth and progress in transition 
 
Source: EBRD online data; Note: GDP growth is average for 2008-2010 
 
The simple analysis performed in Figure 5 suggests that there may be an 
overall negative relationship between progress with transition and the 
average growth during the crisis period. This indicative finding is 
opposite to what might be expected if transition were to lead to a more 
flexible market economy. The rationale behind that would be that a 
greater progress with transition leads to increased integration into the 
global economy. As already mentioned above, this relation emphasises 
the strength of the transmission of effects from the external 
environment to domestic economies may depend on initial institutional 
conditions at the start of the economic crisis. 
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De Macedo et al. (2008) propose a useful extension to this literature 
which incorporates Amable’s (2003) idea of institutional 
complementarity into the analysis of the effect of transition progress on 
growth. They create an innovative ‘reform complementarity’ index 
based on the EBRD data, and demonstrate a U-shaped relationship 
between complementarity and level of reforms. This suggests that 
performance may deteriorate as lop-sided reforms are initially 
introduced, before improving as reform complementarities come into 
line as the scope of reforms widens over time. In future research it 
would be interesting to investigate the effects of such 
complementarities on the ability of countries to mitigate the effects of 
the economic crisis. 
 
THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE 
The broad institutional environment measured through the World Bank 
Governance Indicators (WBGI) provides an alternative measure of 
institutional quality which may affect the ability of countries to respond 
flexibly to the economic crisis. In a recent study, Beck and Laeven (2006) 
use this measure of institutions to show that institutions positively 
affect growth in transition economies. The WBGI measures various 
aspects of institutional quality including the rule of law, government 
effectiveness, and measures to deal with corruption.  If institutional 
quality positively influence growth, then we may expect that it would 
also serve to moderate the impact of the crisis, or at least lead to a 
rapid recovery.  
Figure 6 shows the simple bi-variate relationship between the 3-year 
average growth rate 2008-2010 and institutional quality measured by 
the WBGI scores. The correlation coefficient between the two variables 
is -0.4. Slovenia, with the highest quality of institutions, has the lowest 
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growth rate next to Turkey, while Albania with the highest growth rate 
has only an average level of institutional quality. Improved institutional 
quality appears to offer little advantage to countries in resisting the 
effects of the crisis on their economies. There is also an inverse 
relationship between institutional quality and volatility over the period 
(correlation coefficient = -0.37). Countries with higher quality of 
institutions appear to have greater volatility in reaction to the effects of 
the economic crisis. That is, they have sharper downturns and 
recoveries, taken together. Again, the explanation may be that 
improved institutional quality goes along with greater integration into 
the global economy, making countries more susceptible to the effects 
of the crisis transmitted from abroad. 
Figure 6: Institutional quality and real gdp growth in see 2008-2010 
 
Source: World Bank Governance Matters database and EBRD online data 
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5. Policy Responses 
The above review has identified the main external transmitters of the 
crisis: collapse of credit growth, FDI inflows, remittances and exports. 
While export demand fell sharply in 2008-09 it has now largely 
recovered, but the large inflows of foreign capital which financed the 
current account deficits are unlikely to return. This suggests that the 
appropriate policy response will have to focus on boosting the domestic 
drivers of growth such as improved competitiveness and business 
environment, increased domestic savings and a better skilled labour 
force (European Commission 2010a). Handjiski et al. (2010) point to the 
need to boost regional trade integration within CEFTA. Sanfey points 
more generally to the need for cross-border cooperation in trade and 
others areas (Sanfey 2010). Others point to the need more generally to 
boost export growth through raising domestic competitiveness and 
directing capital imports towards the tradable goods sectors (EBRD 
2010). A review of the various explanations of the crisis and the main 
policy recommendations that have been proposed is set out in Snoy 
(2011). 
Most of the above are medium to long term policy prescriptions. In the 
face of the economic crisis, policy makers have focused more on the 
short-term reactions to address immediate problems. These short-term 
policy responses to the economic crisis can be considered from the side 
of (i) domestic policy response and (ii) the response of the international 
financial organisations and the international development banks.  
 
DOMESTIC POLICY RESPONSES 
National governments have responded to the economic crisis with a set 
of actions which have combined elements of stimulus and austerity, 
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with an emphasis on the latter. On the side of monetary policy, these 
have involved deposit guarantees, liquidity injections, and 
recapitalisation of banks. Croatia, for example, adopted an aggressive 
programme of monetary easing by reducing the reserve requirements 
and other emergency measures (Gardo 2010). To stabilise banks and 
prevent bank runs, many governments in the region raised the level of 
deposit insurance and introduced government deposit guarantee 
schemes up to certain limits (Sanfey 2010). 
On the side of fiscal policy, the countries of SEE are far more 
constrained than the developed countries of the West as they are less 
able to raise finance on the international markets to cover external 
deficits. In 2008 most countries, with the exception of Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Romania, had some fiscal space to absorb the 
initial effects of the crisis with fiscal deficits below 3% of GDP. This 
initially favourable fiscal position followed from efforts over the 
previous decade to control public expenditure in line with IMF advice 
and EU pre-accession programmes. In 2009, however, government 
budget balances deteriorated in all countries as tax revenues fell and 
small fiscal stimulus packages were introduced12. In 2009, budget 
deficits rose above 3% of GDP everywhere (except Macedonia) while in 
Albania and Romania the budget deficit reached 7.4% (see Figure 7).  
In 2010, the deficits fell in Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, 
Slovenia and Turkey partly due to the austerity measures but also to a 
recovery in tax revenues following modest economic growth. In a few 
countries budget deficits continued to widen: in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Serbia which had permissive IMF programmes in place, 
                                                 
12
 An account of the fiscal stimulus measures can be found in Sanfey (2010) who 
concludes that “All of these measures have brought some relief here and there, but 
they cannot be said to constitute a coherent anti-crisis approach” (Sanfey 2010: 11.) 
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and in Croatia and Montenegro where negative growth in 2010 further 
depressed tax revenues.   
Figure 7: Government budget balance 2008, 2009, 2010 (% GDP) 
 
Source: EBRD online data 2011 
 
As budget balances deteriorated, most SEE countries introduced 
austerity programmes to reign in their budget deficits. Croatia 
introduced a public sector salary freeze and a wide range of spending 
cuts in 2009, and in 2010 adopted an Economic Recovery Programme 
which involved inter alia limitations on the duration of unemployment 
benefits. Serbia introduced a series of anti-crisis measures in 2008 
which were “partially restrictive and partially stimulating” (GoS 2008). 
Stimulating measures included support for SMEs and for export 
oriented companies. Measures were also introduced to stimulate 
foreign investment and to provide additional guarantees for the 
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financial sector. Restrictive measures included a budget deficit target of 
1.5% of GDP, cuts to salaries of civil servants, restrictions on pensions 
and social benefits. The public sector workforce was also to be cut by 
10%. In neither case were the measures effective in preventing a sharp 
deterioration in the government budget balance over the period 2008-
2010. 
Among members of the eurozone, Slovenia adopted an adventurous 
fiscal stimulus package amounting to 2.1% of GDP in 2008 order to 
counteract the impact of declining external demand leading to a tripling 
of its fiscal deficit in 2009. Fiscal stimulus thus soon became 
unsustainable. It was immediately followed in 2010 by tough austerity 
measures designed to reduce the government deficit below 3% of GDP 
and at stabilising general government gross debt at 45% by 2013, 
involving budget cuts amounting to 2.8% of GDP in 2010 and similar 
cuts programmed for the next two years (OECD 2011). Greece - another 
eurozone member - has entered into a fully-fledged public debt crisis 
with a budget deficit of 15.4% of GDP in 2009, and had to introduce 
dramatic budget expenditure cuts amounting to 6% of GDP in 2010, to 
be followed by further substantial expenditure cuts to reduce the deficit 
below 3% by 2014 in order to reassure the international financial 
markets about its creditworthiness.  
Commenting on the economic and fiscal programmes of the potential 
candidate countries in 2010 the European Commission concluded that: 
“The medium-term fiscal framework appears to be cautious in the case 
of Montenegro, broadly plausible for Serbia, slightly optimistic in the 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and optimistic for Albania. All 
programmes fail to spell out in sufficient detail the medium-term 
measures underlying the planned improvement in the fiscal balance” 
(European Commission 2010). 
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Differences in the exchange rate policies did not seem to have much 
effect on export performance during the early period of the economic 
crisis; as discussed above exports fell almost uniformly by between 20% 
and 30% (see Table 3). The countries in the region have adopted 
different exchange rate regimes: currency boards in Bulgaria, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, unilateral euro adoption in Kosovo and Montenegro, 
managed floats in Croatia and Serbia, a hard peg in Macedonia and a 
floating exchange rate in Albania13. Countries which have adopted fixed 
exchange rates and hard pegs, as well as those which have borrowed 
heavily in foreign currency, such as Croatia, have taken active monetary 
policy measures to constrain credit growth, and in some cases sharply 
raise interest rates to defend their currencies and stem losses of scarce 
foreign exchange reserves. Macedonia for example raised its central 
bank interest rate from 7% to 9% when the crisis began, at the end of 
2008. However, it could be argued that in countries with permanently 
fixed exchange rates the recovery could be slower than elsewhere, as it 
could take more time to adjust domestic wages and prices to restore 
international competitiveness to recover lost export markets14. 
 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY RESPONSE 
It is possible that the impact of the crisis on the SEE region would have 
been much greater if it had not been for a concerted and effective 
policy response from international institutions (Cviić and Sanfey, 2010). 
This response ranged from IMF support programmes to tailored 
agreements between international institutions and commercial banks 
to ensure continued lending to the region. Starting in 2009, IMF support 
                                                 
13
 Available evidence seems to show that transition countries which adopted fixed 
exchange rates had lower inflation and higher rates of growth than countries which did 
not, controlling for other relevant factors (De Grauwe and Schnabl, 2008) 
14
 This argument is also presented in the EBRD Transition Report (2009: 17). 
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programmes have been directed towards Romania (through a €3.5bn 
Stand-by Agreement), Bosnia and Herzegovina (€1.1bn), and Serbia 
(€402.5m). These measures were designed in part to stem capital flight 
by supporting fiscal consolidation and encouraging parent banks abroad 
to remain committed to the countries involved. 
The support from the IMF was backed up by the “Vienna Initiative”, a 
multilateral agreement which ensured that host governments would 
provide deposit insurance and liquidity support for the banks, that EU-
based parent banks would recapitalise and refinance their subsidiaries 
in the region, that home governments would allow bank groups to 
access home country financial resources without restrictions, and that 
the MDBs would provide large-scale financial support. This agreement 
was designed to prevent foreign-owned banks from pulling out of the 
region by committing them to refinance loans that they had placed 
domestically. It was one of the most important factors in stabilising the 
banking system in SEE early in the crisis. However, new risks are 
emerging as a consequence of the continuing eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis, and it is quite likely that further international interventions will be 
required. 
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6. Conclusion  
As elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, transition countries in the 
European super-periphery have been adversely affected by external 
events originating in the USA and the core EU member states. While the 
global economic crisis has had a severe negative impact on the SEE 
region, its magnitude has varied across countries. Some countries were 
very badly affected in 2009 with sharp declines in GDP, industrial 
production and exports, while other countries have been relatively less 
affected. In some countries the contraction persisted in 2010, while in 
others only a shallow recovery was evident. Only Albania and Turkey 
were exceptions to this general picture. The paper has addressed the 
reasons for these differences in economic performance.  
From late 2008, the global economic crisis led to the collapse of 
external sources of finance for SEE, which had been the main driver of 
rapid growth in the region since 2000. Four main channels transmitted 
the effects of the crisis to the SEE region: a sharp contraction of foreign 
credits to local banks, a sharp reduction in FDI inflows, a precipitate fall 
in demand for exports, and falling remittance income. The findings 
relating to these four factors are that (i) the fall in the rate of domestic 
credit growth was greater where there was a higher presence of foreign 
banks, (ii) the falls in FDI were greater where pre-crisis per capita 
inflows were higher (iii) a uniformly large reduction in exports took 
place across the board, (iv) remittances fell only in Romania and 
Moldova, perhaps due to special factors but more likely the data are 
unreliable. Thus, overall it seems that initial structural conditions do 
explain some of the variation in crisis impact such that the more 
integrated economies seem to have been more badly affected. 
The paper has also investigated whether the different institutional 
structures which were created during the transition period have had 
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any discernible effect on the different ways in which the crisis impacted 
on the countries of the region. The analysis suggests that those 
countries which have made most progress in creating a modern 
institutional framework supportive of private enterprise and a 
competitive market economy, and which have consequently become 
the most integrated into global and European markets have suffered 
the worst impact of the crisis. For example, countries which have made 
more progress in transition, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Romania, which have a higher degree of EU integration, and have 
higher ‘quality of institutions’, are those which have experienced the 
highest rate of negative growth of GDP over the two year period from 
2009-10. This indicates that their progress in adopting market-friendly 
institutions, which provided a base for the development of a capitalist 
economy, has simultaneously increased their vulnerability to external 
shocks. Countries which have made less institutional progress were less 
affected by the external shock of the global economic crisis.   
Policy responses to the crisis also differed, at least initially. At first, 
measures were applied to boost growth through small scale fiscal 
stimulus measures such as tax breaks for businesses, and through 
easing monetary policies. Lacking the fiscal space to sustain such 
stimuli, however, governments were soon forced to revert to austerity 
measures to restrain public expenditure, which had previously been the 
main domestic source of economic growth. All of this has resulted in the 
region becoming even more dependent on the support of international 
financial institutions. The Vienna Initiative supported the position of 
foreign banks in the region early on in the crisis. However, there are 
signs that some banks are beginning to feel the effects of bad loans and 
are now experiencing major difficulties. With the eurozone crisis 
continuing, the increasing number of foreign banks from European 
countries that are undergoing difficulties poses yet another risk of 
default for these countries, especially in cases where the ratio of 
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external debt to GDP is approaching 100% or more (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Montenegro and Slovenia).  
Our overall conclusion therefore is that (i) there is some evidence that 
the countries that were more integrated into the EU were more 
affected by the crisis, especially through the credit and foreign 
investment channels, that (ii) countries which made more progress with 
transition were more affected, possibly because this has led to deeper 
structural and institutional integration to the EU, and (iii) policies have 
everywhere tended towards austerity, but with differing degrees of 
success in reducing budget deficits. While international support has 
been important, this merely highlights the structural fragility of the 
countries of the region which have received such support. 
As the crisis is expected to deepen in the future in the absence of a 
sustainable solution to the ongoing crisis of sovereign debt in the 
eurozone periphery (e.g. Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy) it is quite likely 
that the effects will spill over even more deeply than before in the SEE 
region. As we can see from the drama that is unfolding in the EU, the 
crisis is far from over. This will not be a sprint but a marathon, it seems. 
So, the question remains whether those countries that are less 
integrated into the EU and hence have been less deeply affected by the 
crisis will recover more quickly from it. In Serbia, for example, the 
ongoing risks are higher than might be thought from inspection of data 
on GDP growth alone, especially as these do not correspond with the 
data showing declining industrial production and increasing 
unemployment; in fact, a drop of between 4% and 5% of GDP in 2009 is 
more in line with all the other available data than the recorded drop of 
just 1%. That would put Serbia at a much higher risk of a long recession, 
as could also be expected in several other countries in the region. 
Bearing in mind our previous analysis, and the fact that all the countries 
in the region substantially depend on the EU for markets and for 
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finance, it seems logical that the more progressive economies that are 
more closely related to the EU will stand to gain from the recovery to a 
greater extent, while the countries that have failed to make a successful 
transition to a pro-market variety of capitalism, and have instead 
adopted a Mediterranean (or Balkan) style of capitalism relying on a 
high degree of state intervention and low institutional 
complementarity, may prove less adaptable in responding to the 
opportunities presented  by the  future economic recovery when and if 
it eventually takes place.  
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